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Prosecution Benefits: A New HOPE for Bridging 
the Patent Law Access Gap 
Eben Allen 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In January 2010, a massive earthquake struck Haiti.1 Months after the 
quake, although relief efforts continued in the impoverished nation, an 
epidemic of cholera suddenly broke out.2 Thousands of people contracted 
the disease, and hospitals struggled to keep up with treatments as the death 
toll mounted.3 Humanitarian organizations worked with the government to 
rush massive quantities of aid supplies, including 10,000 boxes of water 
purification tablets and 2,500 jerricans, yet the disease continued to spread 
such that nearly a month later, one United Nations plan was still calling for 
$89 million for clean water and sanitation and hygiene supplies.4 
Cholera’s spread in the aftermath of the quake is significant because 
cholera is not easily communicable between people and is almost entirely 
transmitted by contaminated water and food.5 Yet, due to the extreme 
poverty and natural disaster fallout in Haiti, the disease continued to spread 
                                                 
 JD Seattle University School of Law, expected 2012. BS Mechanical Engineering, cum 
laude, University of Portland 2007. Eben would like to thank his parents (Bruce and Jan 
Allen) and his wife (Roxanne Allen) for all of their encouragement and patience during 
the writing process. Additionally, he extends a special thanks to the SJSJ Editorial Staff 
and Professor Heidi Bond for their valuable insight in improving his article. 
1 Press Conference, Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator on Humanitarian Efforts in 
Haiti, United Nations (Oct. 22, 2010), 
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2010/101022_Bragg.doc.htm [hereinafter 
Bragg]. 
2 Id.  
3 Randal C. Archibold, Cholera Deaths Up in Haiti, With Worst to Come, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 15, 2010, at A4. 
4 Id.; Bragg, supra note 1. 
5 2010 Haiti Cholera Outbreak, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, 
http://www.cdc.gov/haiticholera/preventionandcontrol.htm (last updated Nov. 4, 2010). 
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as Haitians were unable to access clean water.6 The aid provided was still 
insufficient to meet the needs of the Haitian people—insufficient to fully 
and quickly quell the plague.7 But what if the resources available had more 
purchasing power: what if the dollars channeled through humanitarian 
organizations were able to purchase more aid supplies for the same price? 
What if the cost of water purification technology was cheaper and more 
readily available to this stricken nation? 
Intellectual property regimes foster the innovation of new technologies, 
including water purification. However, these regimes also often raise the 
price of that technology. This hinders people’s ability to access the 
technology due to the increased expenditure required to acquire the 
technology. Scholars have suggested various approaches for leveraging 
exclusive intellectual property rights (such as patents) to alleviate this 
access problem.8 However, very few consider utilizing the process known 
as patent prosecution, which is the application process used to acquire these 
patents in the first place. Nevertheless, simple adjustments in the patent 
prosecution process could be implemented to both alleviate the access 
problem and resolve issues inherent in patent prosecution.9 
  
                                                 
6 Archibold, supra note 3. 
7 Compare Bragg, supra note 1 (138 deaths as of October 22, 2010), with Archibold, 
supra note 3 (917 deaths as of November 14, 2010). 
8 Several such proposals are discussed infra Part II, Section B. 
9 The primary concerns with the current patent prosecution process are its speed, cost, 
and high degree of complexity, as discussed infra Part II, Section C. 
Prosecution Benefits 409 
VOLUME 10 • ISSUE 1 • 2011 
While many of the proposed solutions to the access problem are not 
based on prosecution, these approaches still provide valuable lessons about 
the components necessary for an effective access solution. This article 
explores those lessons and forms them into a prosecution-based approach to 
the access problem. This approach is to implement a new patent 
classification—a specialized set of rules for lifesaving technology—that 
offers prosecution benefits in exchange for minimal restrictions that both 
improve access and protect an innovator’s ability to charge a premium in 
the primary market. Such a classification provides a compromise between 
the socially just desire to make new technology affordable for humanitarian 
purposes and the economic need to make innovation profitable. 
In Part II, this article explores the background of the access problem 
inherent in intellectual property law. Section A explores the competing aims 
that give rise to the access problem. Section B reviews some access-
improving approaches suggested by scholarship and implemented via 
legislation. Finally, Section C outlines a new approach that focuses on 
prosecution benefits. This approach is to establish a new patent 
classification that will simultaneously benefit both society (by improving 
access) and businesses (by alleviating onerous aspects of the patent 
prosecution process). Because the new classification would have a strong 
humanitarian dimension and would address the most drastic instances of the 
access problem, the new classification proposed by this article is called the 
Humanitarian-Objective Patent Endorsement, or “HOPE” Certification. 
Such an approach engages the access issue in a preemptive instead of a 
reactionary manner, and the HOPE Certification can be modeled after the 
special classifications for plant and design patents. Since both plant and 
design classifications define (1) the particular subject matter covered by the 
classifications and (2) the rules that apply specifically to the classifications, 
Part III discusses the subject matter definition necessary for the HOPE 
classification. Part IV covers the rationale and mechanics behind the 
suggested rules for the implementation of the HOPE Certification. 
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II. UNDERSTANDING THE ACCESS PROBLEM 
A. Defining the Access Problem 
The purpose of patent law is to “advance the public welfare through the 
talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”10 Patent law 
accomplishes this through a simple exchange: full disclosure of how to 
make and utilize an invention11 in exchange for a limited monopoly on the 
invention’s implementation in any form.12 Reflected in this exchange are 
the two principal values of patent law: providing incentives for invention 
and providing access to technology.13 This “need for access/need for 
incentive dichotomy”14 is at the heart of patent law, and this article will 
refer to it as the “innovation dichotomy.”  
1. Providing Incentives for Invention  
The “economic philosophy behind the clause [in the US Constitution] 
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that 
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to 
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 
                                                 
10 Charles Allen Black, The Cure for Deadly Patent Practices: Preventing Technology 
Suppression and Patent Shelving in the Life Sciences, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 397, 
401–02 (2004) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)). 
11 The standard of disclosure mandated by US patent statutes is a written description that 
sets forth “the manner and process of making and using [the invention] in such full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . 
to make and use the same.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-129, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
12 Patent statutes give a patent holder the right to exclude others from making, using, 
selling, offering to sell, or importing the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). In the 
United States, the duration of this exclusionary right lasts twenty years from the 
application date of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). 
13 Wesley A. Cann, Jr., On the Relationship Between Intellectual Property Rights and 
the Need of Less-Developed Countries for Access to Pharmaceuticals: Creating a Legal 
Duty to Supply Under a Theory of Progressive Global Constitutionalism, 25 U. PA. J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 755, 757 (2004). 
14 Id. 
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‘Science and useful Arts.’”15 “In a world of limited resources and easily 
shared knowledge, there is little incentive for anyone to undertake the 
substantial costs and risks of research when the reward is shared by any 
who wish to mimic the advance.”16 For this reason, in US patent law, the 
inventor of a new technology is guaranteed a monopoly on the new 
technology for a limited time, specifically the “power to prevent [others] 
from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the patented 
invention.”17 This right to exclude all other competitors from independently 
utilizing the invention has two benefits. First, it provides the inventor with 
sufficient time to recover the expenditures made in developing the 
invention. Second, it serves as an opportunity to make a profit, providing 
the personal gain that the Founding Fathers deemed may serve as the best 
way to motivate and foster technological advances. 
2. Providing Access to Technology 
The disclosure part of the exchange is intended to ensure that the 
invention will be available to the public at large once the patent has run its 
course—that people beyond the initial inventor will understand how the 
invention works. Such understanding ensures that the public can maximize 
the use of the invention in three ways. First, disclosure ensures that the 
technology will not be lost should the initial producer be unable to continue 
supplying the market with the product of his or her invention (e.g., in the 
case of an inventor dying without explaining his invention or a company 
going out of business without ever revealing its processes). Second, the 
public is better able to implement technology that is already well-explained 
in publicly available patent paperwork. Third, subsequent individuals will 
be better able to improve upon the design if they understand the 
                                                 
15 Black, supra note 10, at 402 (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)). 
16 Michael Ilg, Market Competition in Aid of Humanitarian Concern: Reconsidering 
Pharmaceutical Drug Patents, 9 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 149–50 (2010). 
17 Black, supra note 10, at 401–02. 
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fundamentals of how it works in the first place. The public thus avoids the 
risk of losing inventions, expands the value of the immediate 
implementation, and gains the value of subsequent improvements.18 
3. The Difficult Balance Between Access and Incentive 
Patent laws accordingly attempt to balance “two competing goals: giving 
adequate economic incentives to pioneering inventors while ensuring that 
the improvers who follow—and the public as a whole—[can] make 
effective use of inventions.”19 While the goal is to organize patent law in 
such a manner as to maximize gain in both categories (incentives and 
access), sometimes the values are mutually exclusive instead of mutually 
beneficial. 
The tension between the two interests is often most easily visible in the 
context of lifesaving technology when access would seem to deserve more 
weight in the balancing test than incentive. A greater emphasis on the 
incentive of personal gain can result in a substantial portion of the public 
never receiving the benefit of the innovation; the people that most 
desperately need the innovation die before the innovation becomes 
accessible to them. This can happen either by the nefarious refusal to use 
patented technology or by the less suspect—but also problematic—pricing 
considerations in implementing patented technology. 
 
a) Nefarious Refusal to Use Patented Technology 
A troubling side effect of a patent holder’s right to exclude others from 
utilizing an invention is that the right to exclude applies equally to 
lifesaving technology.20 Should a patent holder so choose, he or she may 
                                                 
18 A goal of patent law is “ensuring that the improvers who followed [the pioneering 
inventors]—and the public as a whole—could make effective use of inventions.” Id. at 
401 (quoting Matthew J. Conigliaro et al., Foreseeability in Patent Law, 16 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1045–1046 (2001)) (emphasis added). The focus on these three distinct classes 
suggests three ways that disclosure maximizes use of innovation. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 408. 
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“legitimately” exert the exclusionary right to outright block consumer 
access to lifesaving technology.21 The two most common approaches are: 
“inventing and patenting new technology with the intent that it never be 
used” (‘sleeping patents’), and “acquiring patents from others with the 
intent not to develop the technology” (‘patent shelving’).”22 While the 
solution suggested in this article could apply to the sleeping patents issue, 
this article focuses instead on the non-malicious price considerations that 
follow. As such, the very real and disturbing problem of nefarious refusal to 
use patented technology is beyond the scope of this article.23 
 
b) Problematic Pricing Considerations 
A slightly different result of these competing goals of incentive and 
access is that some individuals may become unable to afford lifesaving 
technology because the premium put in place by intellectual property 
protections raises the price of the technology beyond the individual’s 
means.24 This problem is commonly referred to as “deadweight loss.”25 
In his article regarding pharmaceutical drug patents, Michael Ilg explains 
deadweight loss and the amplification of its significance in the context of 
lifesaving technology: 
A core difficulty of the patent approach, inherent since its 
inception, has been the loss of willing consumers due to monopoly 
pricing, identified as deadweight loss in economic terms. So as 
monopoly pricing extracts a lucrative price premium, it is 
inefficient, in that many willing consumers who would be able to 
purchase at a price lower than the monopoly price are excluded, 
and there is a block of lost purchasers due to the artificially-high 
price floor of the monopoly patent protection. While the loss of 
efficient pricing because of monopoly protection is an abstract 
                                                 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 However, for a fascinating look at this issue, see id. 
24 Ilg, supra note 16, at 156–57. 
25 Id. 
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issue of access which concentrates upon lost potential consumers, 
the question of access has gone far beyond deadweight loss and 
optimal purchase price. The issue of access has shifted perceptibly 
from abstract shades of grey into stark relief; from concerns over 
lost consumer purchasers at a monopoly price point to pointed 
humanitarian concerns over receipt of needed relief.26 
As Ilg points out, deadweight loss is often simply an economic 
consideration: a way of calculating the number of customers excluded by 
the high monopoly price. However, his comment prompts an important 
question: if society decides that deadweight loss is an acceptable price to 
pay for innovation when it simply excludes some customers from a 
convenient technology, then is society still willing to accept the price when 
technology is potentially lifesaving, and deadweight loss begins to literally 
refer to the dead? 
The two cogent examples that follow, both of which have been 
extensively documented in scholarship, show that this is not simply a 
philosophical rumination, but a weighty social concern. 
 
(1) AIDS Medication 
“According to the World Health Organization, 95 percent of those 
infected with HIV live in developing countries.”27 “Despite the existence of 
treatments, the vast majority of those infected with HIV do not have access 
to the pharmaceutical products that are available in many developed 
countries (e.g., Canada and the United States).”28 “The result is an access 
gap, whereby patients in low- and middle-income countries cannot afford 
                                                 
26 Id. 
27 Mark D. Penner & Prakash Narayanan, Amendments to the Canadian Patent Act to 
Address Drug Access: Is Help on the Way?, 60 FOOD DRUG L.J. 459, 460 (2005). 
28 Id. 
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expensive patented drugs, while patients in wealthy countries can afford and 
do have access to such treatments.”29 
In certain instances, the gap does narrow when patents finally expire. For 
example, “the average worldwide price for antiretroviral combination 
therapies (ARVs) that treat HIV/AIDS decreased from $10,000 to as little 
as $168 per patient upon expiration of key patents. This price reduction 
significantly enhanced access to critical treatments for millions who 
desperately need them.”30 However, two questions still remain. How many 
lives were priced out of the market while waiting for the cost of this 
particular treatment to drop to an affordable level? How many more people 
will die before the currently available medications eventually become 
economically feasible for those most in need of them? 
 
(2) Agricultural Advances 
Agriculture is arguably “the key to global food security and economic 
development in the world’s poorest countries.”31 With the advent of 
genetically modified crops that can produce higher yields or greater 
resistance to pests, one might expect that starvation should no longer be an 
issue in poor areas of the world.32 However, major corporations such as 
Monsanto hold many of the patents on these technologies and vigorously 
deny general access to them.33 In poverty-stricken locations, the premiums 
charged for the seeds are often so high that poor, rural farmers find 
themselves with no choice but to incur massive debts just to purchase the 
                                                 
29 Beirne Roose-Snyder & Megan K. Doyle, The Global Health Licensing Program: A 
New Model for Humanitarian Licensing at the University Level, 35 AM. J. L. & MED. 
281, 281–82 (2009). 
30 Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917, 
919 (2009). 
31 See Ronald L. Phillips, Introduction: Intellectual Property Rights for the Public Good: 
Obligations of U.S. Universities to Developing Countries, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 177, 
180 (2004). 
32 Jeffrey J. Mindrup, Transgenic Crops in the Age of Human Rights: Moral Uncertainty 
and Rational Risk Policy, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 213, 226 (2007). 
33 Id. at 227. 
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only seed with sufficient yield to sustain and feed their families.34 The 
resulting question is similar to that of medications: how many lives were 
priced out of the market simply because the newest and most promising 
agricultural technology was unavailable to those most in need of it, and the 
unavailability was not due to the expense of production, but rather to the 
expense of intellectual property markups? 
 
c) Addressing the Innovation Dichotomy Balance 
Even advocating for placing the highest priority on the preservation of 
human life, always choosing access in favor of incentive would be self-
defeating. On the one hand, without incentives many lifesaving 
technologies would not exist, and many people would die who could 
otherwise have been saved by new technologies. On the other hand, if 
technology pricing is so inflated by the monopoly incentive that the 
technologies are inaccessible to all but the inventors and those able to pay 
absolute top dollar, then those same people will still die. Thus, the 
incentive’s utility is negated or diminished. While in an ideal world, any 
incentive for innovation would provide a reciprocal gain to access, 
achieving a perfect balance that will work for every given situation in 
reality is likely impossible. Yet, when people with the greatest need have 
the least access to the solutions, the system requires revision. 
However, patents clearly do not cause this disparity between need and 
access in every situation. Thus, a comprehensive overhaul of the system is 
not necessary; instead, creative solutions are needed to specifically target 
the greatest disparities and add incentives to provide access where it is most 
crucial. The section that follows surveys various approaches suggested in 
scholarship to address the innovation dichotomy, after which this article 
                                                 
34 See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, On India’s Despairing Farms, a Plague of Suicide, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at A1 (“The modified seeds can cost nearly twice as much as 
ordinary ones, and they have nudged many farmers toward taking on ever larger loans, 
often from moneylenders charging exorbitant interest rates.”). 
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will discuss a new potential tool in alleviating the access gap and balancing 
the innovation dichotomy: a new classification within patent prosecution. 
B. Approaches to Address the Access Problem 
Action taken to address the access problem falls into two main camps: 
scholarship and legislation. Many authors contribute to the scholarship by 
proposing theories in journals and other publications in an effort to improve 
understanding of the issue. At the same time, a few of the proposals have 
been the subject of government response, and government bodies around 
the world have introduced legislation to address the access problem.35 
1. Scholarship 
Much ink has been spilled regarding this innovation dichotomy, and 
scholars have sought and suggested solutions, particularly in the access to 
medication discussion.36 At some level, any proposed solution affects the 
basic exchange of patent law, either by adjusting the rights conferred by a 
patent or by modifying the conditions imposed to receive the patent rights. 
Changing the rights or the conditions in turn affects access to lifesaving 
technology as well as incentives to invent. The challenge is to find a set of 
adjustments to both patent conditions and patent rights such that an increase 
is realized not only in access to lifesaving technology, but also in incentives 
to invent. The varied scholarly solutions provide useful insight into what 
modifications to rights and conditions are available, and the 
recommendations suggest components that can be incorporated in future 
approaches to ensure that newly proposed solutions are effective. 
 
a) Adjustments to Term Length 
Currently, the basic exchange of conditions for rights in patent law is 
relatively straightforward. The condition is that an inventor must fully 
                                                 
35 E.g., TRIPS and the Bayh-Dole Act, discussed infra Part II, Section B(3)(a). 
36 Cann, supra note 13, at 757. 
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disclose an invention by sufficiently explaining in a patent application how 
the invention works and how to make it.37 In return, the inventor receives 
the right to exclude any other person from utilizing38 the invention for 
twenty years.39 
The exact proportions of this exchange have been modified over the 
years, most notably with the length of the term of the patent’s validity.40 
Accordingly, one solution that scholars have proposed is to shorten the term 
of patents for humanitarian contexts so that humanitarian technology 
escapes exclusionary control sooner.41 However, simply shortening the term 
is likely to be an ineffective long-term solution that simply falls prey to the 
perpetual debate about what precisely is the optimum term length to balance 
public access against inventive incentive. However, this option is helpful in 
that it suggests creating a solution that is narrowly tailored to a specific 
subject matter to achieve a more specialized and nuanced approach instead 
of attempting to use a one-size-fits-all approach.42 
                                                 
37 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the 
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or 
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the 
best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.”). 
38 “Utilizing” includes making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the invention. 
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
39 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). 
40 For a discussion of the historical progression of term length from fourteen to 
seventeen to twenty years, see ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. 
LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 132 (5th ed. 
2010). 
41 See Roose-Snyder & Doyle, supra note 29, at 301 (noting that some humanitarian 
licensing schemes “propose shortening the life of an exclusive license to less than the life 
of a patent” to protect against underperforming developers through the option to find 
another). While the article suggests making a context-specific limitation (in this case a 
humanitarian context) on the duration of the term of a license, the concept applies equally 
well to suggest a context-specific limitation on the duration of the term of a patent. 
42 In fact, patent law already implements subject-matter-specific solutions: the USPTO 
has developed special procedural rules for distinct subject matter such as plant patents 
and design patents. Manual of Patent Examination and Procedure, §§ 1500, 1600 (8th ed., 
Rev. 4, Oct. 2005) [hereinafter MPEP]. 
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Another term-adjusting solution proposed by scholars is the 
implementation of severable or transferrable patent terms.43 Also called 
“wild card patent extensions” in other scholarship,44 this suggested 
mechanism addresses the access disparity by rewarding an inventor and 
developer of humanitarian technology with an award of additional 
monopoly time on other patented and profitable technology.45 An example 
of the implementation of this system could be “allowing a company 
developing a new agent targeting a disease or drug-resistant pathogen that 
would otherwise not have a high-profit margin to extend the patent term on 
a high-profit-making drug already within their active portfolio.”46 This 
would motivate development of—and access to—lifesaving technology, not 
by focusing on the profitability of that technology, but instead by focusing 
on the gain from a greater exploitation of an unrelated profitable 
technology.47 
In the United States, the scholarly concept of wildcard patent extensions 
has reached proposed federal legislation, but no such legislation has ever 
passed Congress and been enacted into law.48 In 2005, Congress proposed 
the “Project Bioshield II Act of 2005,” which included provisions to allow 
companies receiving Food and Drug Administration approval for certain 
new high priority drugs to extend the patent on company-selected profitable 
drugs already within their active portfolio.49 Congress ultimately rejected 
                                                 
43 See, e.g., Ilg, supra note 16, at 152–53 (proposing a system that grants transferrable 
patent terms for significant humanitarian drug developments and their donation). 
44 Ann Weilbaecher, Diseases Endemic in Developing Countries: How to Incentivize 
Innovation, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 281, 304 (2009) (“The term ‘wild card’ is used 




47 Ilg, supra note 16, at 153 (suggesting that this strategy could accordingly equate “the 
humanitarian advance at an economic reward level very near to that of the current and 
most lucrative blockbuster drug in the marketable segment of patent reward.”). 
48 Weilbaecher, supra note 44, at 306. 
49 Id. 
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the controversial bill in the face of the uncertainty that it could inject into 
the patent system.50 While shifting extra patent term length to other 
products would cause problems with certainty, the notion of granting a 
patent term extension for a qualifying type of patent could be a useful patent 
right or an inventive incentive to offer in return for a potentially more 
burdensome, yet access-improving condition. 
 
b) Licensing Approaches  
Several of the access-improving methods suggested by scholars in the 
context of licensing provisions could also be implemented into a statutory 
scheme to modify rights and conditions in patent law. Patent holders often 
make trades of rights for alternate incentives in the context of transferring 
partial rights through licensing agreements. When granting a license, a 
patent holder gives up some of his right to exclude by effectively promising 
not to exercise the exclusionary right against another entity when that entity 
utilizes the patented invention in some specific and agreed upon way.51 Two 
considerations affect the impact of licensing: voluntariness and exclusivity. 
Usually, a patent holder provides a voluntary license: he or she voluntarily 
gives up exclusionary rights, often in exchange for a negotiated payment by 
the entity seeking the license.52 However, on occasion, patent holders are 
subject to compulsory licenses: they are forced to give up exclusionary 
rights, either in exchange for a government-determined payment or without 
                                                 
50 Id. at 306–07 (quoting Kathleen Jaeger, president of the Generic Pharmaceutical 
Association) (“The wildcard would destroy the generic industry. We would never know 
which products might be protected by the branded maker, and so we would lose the 
predictability we need to do our own research and development into drugs coming off 
patent.”) (citing Marc Kaufman, Bioterrorism Response Hampered by Problem of Profit, 
WASH. POST., Aug. 7, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/08/06/AR2005080601164.html). 
51 RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND OTHER 
INFORMATION ASSETS 3 (2d ed. 2007). 
52 Id. (“Most licenses are part of a commercial transaction where the person transferring 
the . . . rights places limitations . . . and retains rights”.). Nimmer’s use of the word 
“transaction” signals the voluntary nature of most licenses. 
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compensation because the government mandates that the entity be allowed 
to use the invention, effectively eliminating the patent holder’s exclusionary 
right against that entity.53 A patent holder can also grant exclusive 
licenses—granting one particular licensee immunity from the exclusionary 
rights and promising not to grant any other entity such immunity (or 
nonexclusive licenses granting a licensee immunity) without promising that 
another licensee might receive a similar immunity.54 
Just as modifying the exclusivity of a license changes its impact, 
changing the degree of exclusivity in the patent system could also have 
beneficial effects. For example, “some humanitarian licensing proposals 
have called for a movement toward utilizing non-exclusive licenses as the 
norm” in licensing technology to profit-driven production companies.55 This 
same logic could be applied to statutory patent schemes; instead of having a 
uniform set of rights across all markets, patent laws could be modified so 
that they motivate disclosure in lifesaving technologies (by offering a 
monopoly in settings where consumers can likely afford it) while 
maintaining a humanitarian exception to the monopoly (for humanitarian 
contexts where the consumer is not likely to be able to afford it). Creating a 
distinction between the profit and humanitarian markets is a potentially 
useful alternative to making all humanitarian technology unprofitable by 
eliminating any profit-driven market for it. 
Many nations utilize compulsory license provisions domestically to avoid 
nonuse of domestically patented inventions; after a reasonable time of 
nonuse has passed, a competitor may ask the government for permission to 
                                                 
53 George Tsai, Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime: Lessons for Compulsory 
Licensing Schemes Under the WTO Doha Declaration, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 1063, 1064 
(2009) (defining compulsory licensing) (“[A]uthorization granted by a government to a 
party other than the holder of a patent on an invention to use that invention without the 
consent of the patent holder.”). 
54 NIMMER, supra note 51, at 4. 
55 Roose-Snyder & Doyle, supra note 29, at 301. 
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use the invention.56 Internationally, compulsory licensing has only been 
used to date “in emergency situations where patent-protected 
pharmaceuticals were seen as prohibitively expensive.”57 In the United 
States, Congress has introduced bills that would adopt a compulsory 
licensing exception to current patent laws, but none have passed.58 Given 
the setup of the US patent regime, were such a bill to pass, it would not give 
an access-deprived individual a private right of action59 against the patent 
holder for either shelving the patent or setting the price beyond a given 
threshold of access—it would only give the right to another to use the 
technology.60 
Such immunity from infringement claims would provide a greater boost 
to access than what is currently imposed by international treaty obligations. 
The United States is subject to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), an international patent treaty.61 As the 
TRIPS regime currently stands, a manufacturer could produce medication 
for use in another country that meets certain specifications, even though a 
                                                 
56 Black, supra note 10, at 433. 
57 China, India Push for ‘Patent Free’ Green Tech, EURACTIV, (Nov. 23, 2009), 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/innovation/china-india-push-patent-free-green-tech/article-
187567 (“The Thai government used the mechanism to allow local medicines factories 
[to] produce HIV drugs at a fraction of the cost.”). 
58 Black, supra note 10, at 433–34. 
59 For a viewpoint suggesting that such suits might already be an option due to 
international treaty obligations, see Cann, supra note 13, at 877 (“This Article takes the 
position that treaty duties—including the duty to provide the highest attainable standard 
of health—are enforceable by means of a number of individual and interstate complaint 
systems at the domestic, regional, and international levels.”). See also Peter Straub, 
Farmers in the IP Wrench—How Patents on Gene-Modified Crops Violate the Right to 
Food in Developing Countries, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 187, 189 n.6, 195, 
205, 211 (2006) (asserting that various treaties place an obligation on member States to 
realize socioeconomic rights “including the right to food”and proposing the utilization of 
treaty interpretation canons to resolve the “conflicting obligations” in favor of bypassing 
intellectual property regimes on humanitarian grounds). 
60 Black, supra note 10, at 433–34. 
61 See discussion infra Part II, section B(2)(b). 
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different entity holds the patent in the United States.62 However, while 
compulsory licenses may improve access, they may also generate a problem 
with predictability; in doing a cost-benefit analysis of developing a specific 
technology, the losses imposed by a compulsory license added after the 
patent is issued will not be known and thus cannot be factored into the 
initial profitability evaluation that will drive most innovation. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum from licensing solutions is the use of 
patent pools, which rely on voluntary instead of compulsory licensing. A 
patent pool is “an agreement between two or more patent owners to 
aggregate (pool) their patents and to license them to one another or to third 
parties.”63 This entails a partial giving up of exclusionary rights using an 
incentive of receiving reciprocal immunity from the exclusionary rights of 
others. Through the collaborative effort between various patent holders, 
each individual patent holder or third party is better able to produce and 
improve access to lifesaving technology because the net result is that each 
party participating in the pool is less restricted in what it is allowed to do.64 
An interesting subset of the successful use of patent pools to improve 
access to lifesaving technology is the use of one agency as a broker between 
profit-motivated private companies and access-motivated humanitarian 
organizations. The International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) is a 
particularly inspiring example of this approach.65 IRRI is an institute with 
the goal of providing access to agricultural advances and has been 
substantially involved with genetically engineered rice and the germplasms 
                                                 
62 See discussion infra Part II, section B(2)(b). 
63 Weilbaecher, supra note 44, at 292 (quoting IGWG Briefing Paper on Patent Pools: 
Collective Management of Intellectual Property—The Use of Patent Pools to Expand 
Access Essential Medical Technologies, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Jan. 23, 2007), 
http://keionline.org/content/view/65/1. 
64 Id. at 293 (“Patent pools can accelerate innovation by removing problems associated 
with ‘blocking’ patents, reducing transaction costs, and streamlining and centralizing 
licensing procedures, thereby making it quicker and simpler to obtain licenses.”). 
65 Id. at 295. 
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that contain the genetic information on these advances.66 IRRI works by 
acquiring licenses in conjunction with private companies, essentially 
compiling a collection of the permissions necessary to implement 
agricultural advances in humanitarian contexts without infringing patents.67 
As part of the licensing agreements, IRRI implements material transfer 
agreements (MTAs) as a compliance or record-keeping measure, ensuring 
that the intellectual property utilized in the humanitarian context does not 
begin to compete or impinge upon other markets.68 This allows IRRI to 
continue to provide these sorts of technologies to their clients, which are 
primarily national agricultural research and extension systems (NARES), 
national organizations that distribute the crop technology to the individuals 
most in need of it in their countries.69 
Such a brokering arrangement is valuable in that it brings together many 
entities that might otherwise be at odds or unwilling to negotiate on an 
individual basis. By representing a large group of humanitarian end-users, 
such arrangements can provide organizations with more bargaining power 
and better, more uniform, and more reliable intellectual property protection 
protocols. Through a brokering agency’s efforts in seeking permission to 
use the technology in humanitarian contexts, profit-driven companies 
granting the license may stand to gain the ability to reach markets. This is 
due to the fact that brokered agreements may also include a simultaneous 
compact resolving licensing conflicts with other companies that would 
                                                 
66 Ronald P. Cantrell et al., The Impact of Intellectual Property on Nonprofit Research 
Institutions and the Developing Countries They Serve, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 253, 
257 (“Historically, IRRI’s intellectual property policy for germplasm was simple, driven 
by its mission to ‘improve the well-being of present and future generations of rice 
farmers and consumers, particularly those with low incomes.’ As part of this mission, 
IRRI produced and disseminated rice germplasm and knowledge without restraint as 
global public goods, in a manner readily accessible to the poor.”). 
67 Id. at 258, 260 (“The Institute does not own this germplasm, but rather holds it in trust 
with the responsibility to conserve, maintain, improve, and distribute it for the benefit of 
global agricultural research.”). 
68 Id. at 258. 
69 Id. at 257. 
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otherwise block exploitation in profitable markets.70 IRRI’s use of existing 
distribution organizations that function in the context of their specific 
circumstances is also a savvy way to achieve a more specialized and 
nuanced solution to the context-specific access disparity problem. 
Another solution arising partially out of licensing considerations is the 
approach of “leveraging public scientific capital.”71 This approach focuses 
on the fact that many patented health technologies depend extensively on 
“public scientific capital,” that is, contributions of money, research labor, 
and bodily materials from public institutions such as federal and state 
scientific funding agencies, nonprofit foundations, universities, disease 
advocacy groups, and population-based biobanks.72 Essentially, the 
“leveraging” consists of withholding health technologies from those that 
would only consider the possible profits to be derived from it, effectively 
adding a new condition to the basic patent exchange and adding more 
weight to the access side of the innovation dichotomy balance. The access-
motivated public entity would disclose and grant a monopoly in a profitable 
lifesaving technology in exchange for production of the technology on the 
condition that the licensee or monopolist provides access to those that need 
it most.73 This notion of encouraging actors toward front-end commitments 
is a useful construct for access-improving methods, and it potentially 
addresses the predictability problem raised by the after-the-fact nature of 
compulsory licenses. While leveraging public scientific capital may in this 
way viably assure that access problems do not arise in the context of 
technologies that originate in public science, it offers no solution for those 
cases where private, profit-driven entities have developed lifesaving 
technologies independent of public science sources and thus independent of 
                                                 
70 Id. at 270 (“In exchange for facilitating the availability of GoldenRice(R) for small 
farmers in developing countries, Syngenta secured rights to the rice for exploitation in 
developed countries.”). 
71 Lee, supra note 30, at 944. 
72 Id. at 921–22. 
73 Id. 
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any ties or obligations that may accompany that origin or be imposed upon 
it. However, it is a partial solution, and it has gained recognition in 
legislation such as the Bayh-Dole Act.74 
A similar—but potentially broader—way of imposing additional 
conditions that ensure improved access to lifesaving technology is through 
working requirements. Working requirements oblige a patent holder to meet 
certain requirements or milestones after the patent is issued, or risk some 
sort of forfeiture such as compulsory licensing or statutory invalidity.75 
For example, the patent statutes could be modified to impose a working 
requirement of a commercial development plan, wherein the patent 
applicant would have to lay out a proposal by which it planned to develop 
and provide access to a technology that was clearly lifesaving.76 This would 
                                                 
74 See discussion infra Part II, Section B(2)(a). Additionally, the method has gained 
sufficient prominence such that other scholars have detailed several different types of 
licensing suggestions, approaches, mechanisms, or options that are useful to consider for 
publicly funded research entities. See, e.g., Roose-Snyder & Doyle, supra note 29. 
75 Black, supra note 10, at 434 (“[W]orking requirements are similar to compulsory 
licensing and statutory invalidity. Under these schemes, a patentee must make reasonable 
efforts to bring a technology to market or face compulsory licensing or statutory 
invalidity.”). Statutory invalidity in this case refers to having the patent protections 
voided by declaring the patent invalid as a matter of law for failure to meet specified 
criteria. While working requirements are discussed in this article in the context of 
licensing agreements, the practice could just as easily be included as part of the patent 
statutes, and the same conditions could be imposed because the subject matter is of a 
certain classification. 
76 This idea also comes primarily from an article on possible changes to patent licensing 
procedures that would improve access. Benton C. Martin, The American Models of 
Technology Transfer: Contextualized Emulation by Developing Countries?, 6 BUFF. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 104, 129 (2009) (“[L]egislation could even require that Commercial 
Development Plans for technology that may have a potential lifesaving effect include a 
provision for how the licensee is going to make the technology available to the low-
income population.”). In fact, the article goes on to note that statutorily imposed 
Commercial Development plans already exist in patent licensing contexts. Id. at 129 
n.159 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 209(a)(3)) (“A Federal agency may grant an exclusive or 
partially exclusive license on a federally owned invention . . . only if . . . the applicant 
makes a commitment to achieve practical application of the invention within a reasonable 
time, which time may be extended by the agency upon the applicant’s request and the 
applicant’s demonstration that the refusal of such extension would be unreasonable.”). 
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grant a typical patent monopoly but would provide a mechanism for holding 
corporations accountable to proposed plans that provide improved 
humanitarian access. If the patent holder failed to make reasonable efforts to 
see this plan through, the patent office, court, or other appointed 
government entity would have the power to void the patent, thereby 
allowing other parties to provide access.77 Such plans have the added 
benefit of both the patent holder and the patent grantor being involved in 
setting the terms; having negotiated ahead of time, both sides are more 
likely to honor the agreement instead of litigating the validity of the 
authorization, as is likely to happen in compulsory licensing contexts.78 
c) Non-Patent Law Alternatives 
A completely different approach to improving access by modifying the 
basic exchange of patent law is to change the underlying incentives by 
either partially obviating the need for existing patent rights or outright 
eliminating them. A prize-based model can do either,79 while an open-
source model only performs the latter function.80 Prizes can be either 
implemented in tandem with or in place of standard patent regimes because 
they offer a distinct incentive to invent: the prize-based model provides a 
one-time economic reward payment for the donation of knowledge to the 
public realm.81 The first entity to achieve a certain advance or develop and 
                                                 
77 This example is based on a licensing example of a working requirement. Id. at 129 
(“Requiring Commercial Development Plans . . . would grant a licensee full rights to the 
technology, but would provide research institutions a mechanism for holding 
corporations accountable to proposed access plans. . . . Under a Commercial 
Development Plan approach, if the licensee failed to take reasonable efforts to see this 
plan through, the research institution is not left . . . with media and public pressure as its 
enforcement mechanism. Instead, the research institution would have the power to void 
the license and issue a new license to [a] party who would provide access.”). 
78 Id. at 129–30 (“This approach would also require upfront honesty about provisions for 
access to low-income populations during the licensing process, which may address the 
transparency concerns raised by scholars.”). 
79 See generally Ilg, supra note 16; see generally Weilbaecher, supra note 44, at 302–04. 
80 Weilbaecher, supra note 44, at 302–04. 
81 Ilg, supra note 16, at 151. 
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donate a particular lifesaving technology is thus rewarded by a lump sum 
for completing the technology instead of having to rely solely on 
recuperating development costs through selling the advance at the highest 
price during the monopoly patent protection period.82 Accordingly, the 
technology becomes more affordable on the market, and access to it is 
improved. Although securing sufficient sources of prize money to actually 
motivate the development or donation of lifesaving technology could be 
problematic, prizes are useful in that they provide predictability; developers 
can be sure that the technology is actually desired by the public because a 
specified amount has been set aside for it.83 Thus, even if prizes are not 
ultimately implemented as a solution to the access problem, they provide a 
helpful lesson: before rewarding an entity for developing a technology for a 
humanitarian context, ideally some method should be used to verify that the 
public sector has a need for it. 
An open-source model, on the other hand, completely eliminates 
exclusionary patent rights. An open-source response refers to 
“collaborative, community-based initiatives where the components of the 
project are made available to all and can be modified by all, such that 
individual members re-contribute to the larger project.”84 This approach 
relies on an entirely different set of incentives than the usual profit incentive 
of monopolies: participants are mostly unpaid volunteers who “donate their 
time and expertise for the satisfaction of contributing to the solution of a 
large, complex problem and peer-recognition for having done so.”85 As 
such, open-source models often operate as alternatives outside of the typical 
framework of patent law regulations; open-source initiatives are often not 
                                                 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Weilbaecher, supra note 44, at 286. 
85 Id. at 287. 
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patented after the fact, but enter directly into the public domain.86 While 
specific examples like the Human Genome Project have certainly been 
successful,87 the open-source approach is likely to only help promote access 
in two non-patent areas: non-patentable compounds and rare diseases.88 
However, open-source models do demonstrate the importance of promoting 
collaboration when trying to develop new solutions to the access-innovation 
dichotomy. 
2. Legislation 
Several of the above-mentioned approaches to remedying the access gap 
have actually been implemented to some degree through legislation. The 
following examples have found a significant discussion base in scholarship, 
and are important background for the access discussion. 
a) Bayh-Dole Act 
In 1980, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act.89 To avoid or minimize the 
occurrence of government-funded technologies sitting on a shelf and not 
finding practical application, the Act granted research institutions 
                                                 
86 Id. at 290 (“Open source drugs would not be patented; rather, the drug itself would 
enter the public domain for generic manufacturers to produce. This helps achieve the goal 
of bringing new medicines to people who need them, at the lowest possible price.”). 
87 Id. at 288 (“The international effort to sequence the human genome, known as the 
Human Genome Project, resembled an open source initiative by placing all of the 
resulting data in the public domain rather than allowing any individual researcher to 
patent the results.”). 
88 Id. at 288 (“Open source . . . may be effective in two areas. One is in the development 
of non-patentable compounds or drugs whose patents have expired. Since discovery 
involving these drugs and compounds cannot be protected, nor can they garner large 
profits, developers generally are less interested in pursuing research in these areas. The 
second is in the area of neglected diseases because there is not a large enough market of 
paying customers to justify the expense involved in developing a new drug.”). 
89 Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015-28 (1980) (codified as amended 
at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211, 301-307 (1994). The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation 
Act (passed in the same year as the Bayh-Dole Act) also deals with government-funded 
research. For a more detailed review of that legislation, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public 
Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-
Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1705–09 (1996). 
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permission to take title and sell technologies to private industry, with a 
mandate to bring the invention to practical application.90 Regarding the 
access gap, this Act corresponds most closely to the “Leveraging Public 
Scientific Capital” approach described supra in Part II, Section B(1)(b). 
Before the passage of the Act, “previous legislation had typically 
encouraged or required that federal agencies sponsoring research make the 
results widely available to the public through government ownership or 
dedication to the public domain.”91 However, the Act authorized 
“universities and government agencies to patent and capitalize on their own 
research,” and “[u]niversities now own significant intellectual property 
rights that are licensed to pharmaceutical and biotech companies and are 
developed into lifesaving health innovations.”92 Additionally, the Act 
“allowed and encouraged small businesses and nonprofit organizations to 
patent the results of government-sponsored research, provided that they 
satisfy certain statutorily defined conditions.”93 
Regarding the mechanisms available to the government agencies to direct 
the use of the inventions after they are licensed to commercializing entities, 
Peter Lee explains: 
First, under 35 U.S.C. § 202(a), a funding agency can prohibit a 
grantee from patenting an invention in “exceptional 
circumstances” when the agency determines that such action “will 
better promote the policy and objectives” of the Act. Second, the 
federal government retains a “paid-up license to practice, or have 
practiced” on its behalf, any invention subject to the Act. Third, 
agencies may exercise so-called “march-in rights” to compulsorily 
license subject inventions if certain statutorily defined factors are 
met. Notably, the second of these criteria explicitly permits march-
in rights when “action is necessary to alleviate health or safety 
needs which are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, 
                                                 
90 Martin, supra note 76, at 105. 
91 Eisenberg, supra note 89, at 1663. 
92 Roose-Snyder & Doyle, supra note 29, at 283. 
93 Lee, supra note 30, at 951. 
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assignee, or their licensees.” . . . [B]y regulation, patents covered 
by the Act must state that “this invention was made with 
government support. . . . The government has certain rights in the 
invention.”94 
The Act has also been praised for bringing about significant change. “The 
number of patents filed and licensing agreements signed by universities 
nearly doubled between 1993 and 2003.”95 “Prior to legislation, less than 4 
percent of the tens of thousands of government-funded inventions were 
licensed to industry, resulting in many technologies failing to reach 
practical application.”96 However, “currently, multiple types of research 
institutions in the United States negotiate an increasing number of licenses 
every year, resulting in the issuance of more patents and the disclosure of 
more inventions to technology transfer offices.”97 Furthermore, “[e]ven 
scholars who believe this growth would have occurred eventually without 
the . . . Act agree that the legislation was important because it “accelerated 
this growth by clarifying ownership rules, by making these activities 
bureaucratically easier to administer, and by changing norms toward 
patenting and licensing at universities.”98 
b) TRIPS 
Among the most prominent governmental actions taken that addresses the 
access problem is the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Agreement (TRIPS). Regarding the access gap, this agreement corresponds 
to the “compulsory licensing” approach described supra p. 420. In short, 
TRIPS “allows for the grant of compulsory licenses to combat national 
health emergencies or other circumstances of extreme urgency.”99 Much 
scholarship has been produced on the intricacies of TRIPS and the 
                                                 
94 Id. at 954. 
95 Roose-Snyder & Doyle, supra note 29, at 283. 
96 Martin, supra note 76, at 104. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Tsai, supra note 53, at 1064. 
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subsequent legislation it has prompted. As such, it is worth summarizing 
that history here. 
In 1994, the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements were signed 
at the end of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations.100 Included in the 
Final Act of the new WTO Agreement was the TRIPS Agreement.101 
Effective January 1, 1995, TRIPS required all WTO member-nations to 
meet minimum intellectual property protection standards in their laws and 
practices.102 Representing the need-for-incentive side of the innovation 
dichotomy, the United States, the European Union, and Japan pushed for 
the passage of TRIPS as a means of strengthening patent law protection, 
reflecting the increasing importance of their knowledge-based industries in 
the global economy.103 Characterizing the need-for-access side of the 
innovation dichotomy, developing and least-developed nations accepted the 
passage of TRIPS, seeking freer access to agricultural markets and 
participation in the WTO trade system.104 Accordingly, TRIPS not only 
strengthened international intellectual property protection and established 
new patterns of patent protection, but also provided some mechanisms of 
exception to patent protection to help developing countries adjust to the new 
intellectual property regime.105 
Article 31 of TRIPS outlines one such mechanism: the compulsory 
license.106 The license is intended to allow generic versions of patented 
drugs to be manufactured without a patent owner’s authorization.107 Subject 
to the requirements found in Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
                                                 
100 Fanni (Faina) Weitsman, Eliminating Barriers to the Export of Generic Versions of 
Patented Drugs to Developing Countries—From Doha to Bill C-9, 6 ASPER REV. INT’L 
BUS. & TRADE L. 103, 105 (2006). 
101 Id. at 103. 
102 Tsai, supra note 53, at 1064. 
103 Id. at 1067. 
104 Id. 
105 Weitsman, supra note 100, at 103. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
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governments have the right to issue compulsory licenses to allow 
companies to produce a patented product, or to use a patented process, 
without the permission of the patent owner.108 However, Article 31(f) 
restricts licenses to those that are “predominantly for the supply of the 
domestic market of the Member authorizing such use,” thus limiting the 
amount of the product that can be exported to a needy country under the 
license.109 As a result, less-developed countries lacking the actual capacity 
to manufacture pharmaceuticals domestically were effectively unable to 
import any significant quantity of cheaper generics from drug-producing 
nations where pharmaceuticals were under patent.110 
In March 2001, tensions over this restrictive mechanism came to a head 
when forty-one global pharmaceutical companies filed a lawsuit against 
South Africa, contesting a South African law that provided for enhanced 
access to patented drugs.111 The South African Medicines Act authorized 
the South African health minister to issue compulsory licenses in addition to 
his preexisting authority to allow parallel imports of pharmaceutical 
products when public health was at stake.112 While the pharmaceutical 
companies eventually dropped the lawsuit amidst intense criticism, the case 
generated significant public focus on the issue of compulsory licensing and 
access to essential medicines.113 “Developed countries . . . maintained that 
high levels of IP protection are the best means of increasing access to 
medicines by promoting investment in research and development, whereas 
                                                 
108 Cann, supra note 13, at 817. 
109 Id. (emphasis added). 
110 Id. 
111 Tsai, supra note 53, at 1068–69; Lee, supra note 30, at 932 n.73 (citing Pharm. Mfrs. 
Ass’n v. President of the Republic of S. Africa, Case No. 4183/98 (High Court of South 
Africa, Transvaal Provincial Division)). 
112 Tsai, supra note 53, at 1068–69; Lee, supra note 30, at 932 n.73 (citing Pharm. Mfrs. 
Ass’n v. President of the Republic of S. Africa, Case No. 4183/98 (High Court of South 
Africa, Transvaal Provincial Division)). 
113 Tsai, supra note 53, at 1068–69; Lee, supra note 30, at 932 n.73 (citing Pharm. Mfrs. 
Ass’n v. President of the Republic of S. Africa, Case No. 4183/98 (High Court of South 
Africa, Transvaal Provincial Division)). 
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lesser developed countries . . . argued that the strict limitations of the TRIPS 
Agreement . . . overly restricted users’ interests in pharmaceutical 
technology, especially in the context of health crises.”114 
In November 2001, shortly after the suit against South Africa, the WTO 
held its Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, to clarify issues 
related to the implementation of TRIPS.115 At the conclusion of the 
conference, the ministers signed the “Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health” (hereinafter “the Doha Declaration”).116 The first three 
paragraphs of the Doha Declaration specifically cite the gravity of public 
health problems in the least-developed countries, the importance of TRIPS, 
and the tension between incentives to develop and corresponding product 
prices. The fourth paragraph proceeds to affirm that TRIPS “can and should 
be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’ 
right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to 
medicines for all.”117 In the sixth paragraph, the ministers recognized that 
                                                 
114 Tsai, supra note 53, at 1067. 
115 Weitsman, supra note 100, at 103–05; The Doha Declaration Explained, WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 
2011); The Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/min01_e.htm (last visited Apr. 
2, 2011). 
116 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Pub. 
Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755, 755 (Nov. 14, 2001), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/min01_e.htm#declarations 
[hereinafter WTO Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS]. The “Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health” (referred to as “the Doha Declaration” in this article) 
should not be confused with the Doha Ministerial Declaration. Both declarations were 
signed November 14, 2001, as products of the Ministerial Conference. However, the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration was the overarching declaration summarizing the entire 
work of the conference, while the Doha Declaration was a more specific declaration 
targeting the access problem, couched in terms of public health. While the Doha 
Declaration provides the basis for subsequent enactments, some access-related 
scholarship does reference the Doha Ministerial Declaration as a source for more detail 
concerning the objectives and policy surrounding the Doha Declaration. See, e.g., 
Weitsman, supra note 100, at 103–05. 
117 WTO Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS, supra note 116. 
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“WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the 
pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of 
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement.”118 The Doha 
Declaration called for the Council for TRIPS to find and report to the 
General Council on a solution no later than the end of 2002.119 
On August 30, 2003, the WTO General Council issued a decision 
adopting the solution that the Council for TRIPS had reported.120 Referred 
to as “the 30 August Decision,”121 the WTO decision “waived members’ 
obligations under Article 31(f) of TRIPS and allowed generic versions of 
patented drugs to be exported, under certain conditions, to developing 
countries that had insufficient manufacturing capacities.”122 This interim 
waiver is applicable until the TRIPS Agreement is formally amended.123 
The accompanying statement by the General Council’s chairperson 
mandates that such a waiver system should be used “in good faith to protect 
public health” and not as an “instrument to pursue industrial or commercial 
policy objectives.”124 
In a very thorough review of TRIPS and its implementation,125 Wesley A. 
Cann, Jr. describes the formalities required by the waiver: 
                                                 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 and Corr.l (Aug. 30, 2003), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm. 
121 This article uses the terminology of Tsai, supra note 53, at 1066. Other scholarship 
employs other titles. 
122 Weitsman, supra note 100, at 104. 
123 Cann, supra note 13, at 817–18. 
124 Id. 
125 For Mr. Cann’s extensive and detailed look at wiggle room, imprecision, vague 
definitions, particularly pertinent clauses (including an analysis of the language 
“necessary” in Article 73’s security exception to obligations under the treaty), and 
specific strategies to use the language of the TRIPS agreement and reliance on health 
reasons to justify a country’s evasion, breach, or ignoring of common IP protocol, see 
Cann, supra note 13. 
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The [30 August] Decision requires an eligible importing Member 
to make a notification to the Council for TRIPS that specifies the 
names and expected quantities of the products to be imported and 
confirms (if not a “least-developed” country) that the importing 
Member “has established that it has insufficient or no 
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector” for those 
products. The compulsory license issued by the exporting Member 
must indicate that only the amount necessary to meet the needs of 
the importing country will be manufactured under the license and 
that the entirety of this production will be exported to the eligible 
Member. Additionally, “adequate remuneration” shall be paid in 
the exporting Member to the patent holder taking into account the 
“economic value to the importing Member of the use that has been 
authorized.” All Members are directed to take reasonable measures 
to prevent the re-exportation of the products produced under these 
licenses, and to ensure effective legal means for the prevention of 
diversion.126 
To determine the royalty to be paid as “adequate remuneration,” the Use 
of Patented Products for International Humanitarian Purposes Regulations 
provides a formulation based on the Scheduled Country’s ranking on the 
United Nations Human Development Index (UNHDI); the lower the 
scheduled country’s rank, the lower the royalty to be paid.127 
With this waiver system in place, several countries implemented 
domestic legislation to allow the export of patented drugs to developing 
countries. For example, in May 2004, Canada became one of the first WTO 
member nations to enact legislation reflecting the 30 August Decision by 
amending its patent laws with the passage of Canada’s Access to Medicines 
Regime (CAMR).128 CAMR provisions are codified as part of the Patent 
Act in Section 21 of the Consolidated Statutes of Canada and also 
references Part C of the Canadian Food and Drug Regulations.129 A 
                                                 
126 Id. at 818. 
127 Penner & Narayanan, supra note 27, at 464–65. 
128 Tsai, supra note 53, at 1076. 
129 Id. 
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manufacturer seeking to apply for an export authorization under CAMR 
must apply to the therapeutic products directorate of Health Canada, the 
agency that governs CAMR compliance.130 
Specifically, such an authorized manufacturer is approved to: 
[M]ake, construct and use a patented invention solely for purposes 
directly related to the manufacture of the pharmaceutical product 
named in the application and to sell it or export to a country or 
WTO Member that is listed in any of Schedules 2 to 4 and that is 
named in the application. 131 
The granted authorization is valid for a period of two years, and is 
nonexclusive, nontransferable, and renewable for a further two-year 
period.132 In their overview of the CAMR133 legislation, Penner and 
Narayanan summarize Schedules 2 to 4 as setting out three sets of 
enumerated countries (“Scheduled Countries”) as follows: 
a. any country recognized by the United Nations as being a 
“least-developed country,” whether or not it is a WTO 
Member country (a Schedule 2 Country); 
b. a WTO Member country that has indicated that it intends to 
import drugs needed only in a national or other extreme 
emergency (a Schedule 3 Country); and 
c. any WTO Member or non-WTO Member not listed in 
either Schedule 2 or 3 and which is identified by the 
Organisation [sic] for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) as eligible for development 
assistance, has provided notice of a national emergency 
and lack of capacity, agrees that the drug will not be used 
for commercial purposes, and undertakes to adopt the 
                                                 
130 Id. 
131 Penner & Narayanan, supra note 27, at 461–62. 
132 Id. 
133 Penner and Narayanan refer to the legislation as “the Pledge to Africa Act,” reflecting 
the legislation’s working title from when it was still a bill, “An Act to Amend the Patent 
Act and the Food & Drugs Act” (The Jean Chretien Pledge to Africa). Id. at 461. 
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measures referred to in the General Council Decision (a 
Schedule 4 Country).134 
One important distinction not readily discernable from the schedules is 
that “when an importing country is not a WTO member and is not listed in 
the Schedules of eligible importing countries,” the country is subject to an 
additional requirement before being allowed to invoke CAMR: the country 
must declare “a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency.”135 
The remuneration formula prescribed by CAMR to compensate patent 
holders is “related to the UN Human Development Index (UNHDI) and sets 
the highest rate of remuneration at 4 percent and the lowest at 0.02 
percent.”136 However, an exception to this scheme is available in Section 
21.08 (4)–(7), wherein the patent holder can request a royalty payment 
increase from a Canadian Federal Court if the royalty “‘is not an adequate 
remuneration for the use of invention,’ taking into account humanitarian 
and non-commercial grounds for issuing a license and economic value of 
the use of invention to the importing country.”137 To later terminate a 
compulsory license granted under CAMR, a patent holder must apply to the 
Canadian Federal Court on the grounds that the prospective compulsive 
licensee has failed to provide the necessary information, that the exported 
product has been used improperly, or that the exported product has become 
“commercial in nature.”138 Authorization may also terminate automatically 
“when certain conditions have been met” or if “the Commissioner notifies 
the applicant that the exported products do not meet the requirements of the 
Food & Drugs Act and its regulations.”139 
                                                 
134 Id. at 462–463. 
135 Weitsman, supra note 100, at 120. 
136 Id. at 130. 
137 Id. 
138 Penner & Narayanan, supra note 27, at 465. 
139 Id. 
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Near the same time that Canada enacted CAMR, Norway enacted 
legislation in response to the 30 August Decision and amended its Patent 
Regulations on May 14, 2004.140 “Norwegian regulations do not require that 
an importing non-WTO member country declare a health emergency 
situation in order to be eligible to import generic drugs under a compulsory 
license.”141 The Norwegian legislation “does not provide any clear way of 
assessing the appropriate remuneration[,] . . . [but instead merely] follows 
the vague language of the WTO General Council’s decision on the 
matter.”142 
India also has legislation implementing the 30 August Decision. 
However, it is vague and “gave only a general permit to export patented 
pharmaceutical products to countries with inadequate production capacities 
and in order to cope with public health emergencies.”143 
The European Union’s response to the 30 August Decision coalesced in 
July 2005 when the European Union Committee on International Trade 
published a final report regarding regulations proposed by the European 
Parliament and Council.144 The proposal specifically dealt with regulations 
for “compulsory licensing of patents relating to the manufacture of 
pharmaceutical products for export to countries with public health 
problems.”145 These draft regulations only apply to WTO member 
countries.146 Regarding adequate remuneration, the draft also mirrors the 
nonspecific language of the 30 August Decision, much like the Norwegian 
legislation.147 
                                                 
140 Weitsman, supra note 100, at 133. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 133–34. 




147 Id. at 135. 
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In December 2004, the Netherlands responded to the 30 August Decision 
by enacting “[p]olicy rules on issuing compulsory licenses.”148 “An 
interesting and distinguishing feature of this legislation is that for the first 
time, [nongovernmental organizations] are considered potential applicants, 
if acting for one state or for a group of states.”149 
Even though various countries have implemented legislation to improve 
access to medication within the framework established by TRIPS and 
subsequent modifications, the TRIPS framework still suffers from several 
problems. The framework is plagued by confusion and a lack of clarity: an 
exporter that tries to provide generics under this framework would likely be 
unsure of its legal obligations due to the variation from country to country 
in definitions, royalty rates, and preliminary conditions that must be met 
before distribution may be made to a given country. Additionally, the 
framework suffers from a fundamental fairness problem. The compulsory 
licenses have been introduced long after the patents were issued; this 
introduction changes the rules and modifies the meaning of patent 
protection while the patent is still in force, which unfairly changes the legal 
ramifications of an action already taken. 
One way to resolve these issues is to adjust the process for receiving new 
patents and to root the access improvements in those adjustments instead of 
in compulsory licenses. This approach would provide one standardized set 
of procedures in lieu of several international interpretations, thereby 
resolving clarity issues. It would also provide a clear method of determining 
rights and obligations prior to patent issuance, thereby resolving the 
fairness issue. The primary potential challenge in capturing these benefits is 
simply determining how exactly to implement such an approach. 
                                                 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
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C. A Call for a New HOPE: Humanitarian-Objective Patent Endorsement 
Classification 
Most of the above-proposed solutions offer ways to address the access 
problem by adjusting the innovation dichotomy balance with a way around 
the current patent system (for instance, by limiting otherwise expected 
rights or imposing requirements after the patent is already issued). Other 
proposed solutions seek to develop an alternate approach independent of the 
system. Most are taking an after-the-fact approach, modifying incentives or 
access by adjusting what patent protection provides for already-granted 
patents. By taking an opposite, before-the-fact approach and looking at 
options that could be implemented before a patent is granted, another useful 
tool to address the access disparity could be developed. 
This tool could encourage innovation and improve access by affecting the 
issuance of the patent in the first place, therefore addressing the pre-
issuance prosecution of patents (application process) instead of focusing on 
post-issuance patent litigation (the enforcement of patent rights in court).150 
A new subset of rules in the patent prosecution process that offers 
prosecution benefits in exchange for partial restrictions that do not 
completely destroy an innovator’s ability to charge a premium in the 
primary market could provide a compromise between the socially just 
desire to make new technology affordable for humanitarian purposes and 
the economic need to make innovation profitable. Such a tool would 
simultaneously provide substantial benefits for society and for businesses. 
Society would receive the benefit of faster and more extensive access to 
                                                 
150 This prosecution and litigation distinction merits further explanation. Patent 
prosecution is the process by which a patent is initially issued. It involves correspondence 
between the representatives of the inventor and the patent office and often lasts between 
two and five years before a patent is issued or finally denied. GARY MYERS, PRINCIPLES 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: A CONCISE HORNBOOK 7 (2008). Litigation 
generally refers to lawsuits filed after the patent has finally issued in which the patent 
holder exerts the right given by the patent by filing infringement suits against others that 
are using the invention. 
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humanitarian technology for those that most desperately need it, and 
businesses that are developing the humanitarian technology would receive a 
means to avoid the primary problems encountered in the patent system. 
The primary problems with the patent prosecution process are that it is 
tedious, slow, and expensive. The process is tedious due to its extensive 
correspondence between a patent agent and a patent examiner. It begins 
when, on behalf of an inventor, a patent agent (an individual who has 
passed a qualifying test administered by the US Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO)) files an application with the USPTO.151 An examiner 
responds for the USPTO and evaluates whether or not the invention merits a 
patent.152 The examiner sends “office actions” detailing problems with the 
application to the agent.153 The agent replies with a “response to office 
action” detailing answers to the examiner’s objections.154 This cyclical 
correspondence between the patent examiner and the patent agent often lasts 
between two and five years before a patent is issued or finally denied.155 
Additionally, the USPTO also has an extensive list of fees,156 which quickly 
add up.157 
A new subset of rules providing prosecution benefits—such as improved 
speed, cost, and simplicity—in exchange for improved access could easily 
be accomplished through an already-existing patent law mechanism, the 
patent classification. A patent classification is a specialized subset of rules 
within the patent prosecution framework that can be added to the Manual of 
                                                 





156 See 35 U.S.C. § 41 (2006) amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
157 See, e.g., World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], World Patent Report: A Statistical 
Review, 51 (2008), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/patents/931/wipo_pub_931_2008.pdf. 
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Patent Examination and Procedure (MPEP)158 when the nature of a 
particular subject matter necessitates an individualized set of procedures or 
treatment of the subject matter. For example, in response to the special 
nature of plant patents and design patents, the USPTO included a distinct 
chapter of requirements for each of the two subjects in the MPEP.159 Each 
classification must specify the subject matter involved and the rules 
governing that area. For example, MPEP 1502 conveys the “Definition of 
Design”160 while other sections specify rules regarding required application 
elements,161 examination protocol,162 term length,163 review,164 etc. 
Similarly, MPEP 1601 specifies “Type of Plants Covered,”165 while 
subsequent sections specify rules regarding application elements,166 
examination protocol,167 special reports guidelines,168 etc. 
Given the otherwise poor access to lifesaving technology in poverty and 
disaster situations, a new classification is warranted. The classification 
would be aimed at humanitarian contexts, and as such would be called the 
Humanitarian-Objective Patent Endorsement, or HOPE Certification. 
                                                 
158 MPEP, supra note 42, at Foreword (“This Manual is published to provide US Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO) patent examiners, applicants, attorneys, agents, and 
representatives of applicants with a reference work on the practices and procedures 
relative to the prosecution of patent applications before the USPTO. It contains 
instructions to examiners, as well as other material in the nature of information and 
interpretation, and outlines the current procedures which the examiners are required or 
authorized to follow in appropriate cases in the normal examination of a patent 
application. The Manual does not have the force of law or the force of the rules in Title 
37 of the Code of Federal Regulations.”). 
159 Id. §§ 1500, 1600 (Design Patents and Plant Patents, respectively). 
160 Id. § 1502. 
161 Id. § 1503. 
162 Id. § 1504. 
163 Id. § 1505. 
164 Id. §§ 1510, 1511. 
165 Id. § 1601. 
166 Id. § 1603. 
167 Id. § 1608. 
168 Id. § 1609. 
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Reflecting the patterns and requirements of plant and design patents, Part 
III of this article explores the task of determining an adequate definition for 
Humanitarian Objective in HOPE applications, while Part IV explores the 
guarantees to access (subsection A) and incentives (subsection B) that 
would be implemented by rules for a HOPE Certification. 
III. DEFINING HUMANITARIAN SUBJECT MATTER 
The nature of the access disparity necessitates a new classification. 
People die without lifesaving technology, especially in disaster- and 
poverty-stricken areas. However, the subject matter of a new classification 
should be narrowly tailored to meet only the greatest and most extreme of 
disparities; otherwise, more technologies might be included for special 
treatment that do not carry the heavy weight of the highest need for access, 
and the classification could be abused. Humanitarian organizations have 
traditionally filled the role of identifying and remedying the life-threatening 
situations from which affected individuals have the least opportunity to 
escape. Accordingly, defining such a classification as having a humanitarian 
objective is a good starting point. However, many definitions exist 
regarding the extent of humanitarian work. This section briefly discusses 
two definitions (from among many available): one from the United States 
Code and one from humanitarian relief organizations.169 This section then 
                                                 
169 Definitions from other potential sources (such as dictionaries, case law, patent law 
manuals, and law review articles) are not discussed at length in this article because they 
are not particularly helpful. 
 For example, the dictionary definition of “humanitarian” as “having concern for or 
helping to improve the welfare and happiness of people” is not helpful because it is far 
too broad; all patents could arguably be included within it, considering the close parallel 
to the fundamental statement of purpose of intellectual property rights set forth in the 
Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution: “to Promote the Progress 
of Science and the Useful Arts.” THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE, 931 (Stuart Berg Flexner ed., 2d ed. 1987); Myers, supra note 150, at 7; US 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 At least two cases make tangential references to the definition of “humanitarian” in the 
immigration context. Mounkam v. Way, 2007 WL 974102, at *10 (D.Ariz., Mar. 30, 
2007) (stating that humanitarian reasons to allow an exception to deportation include 
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suggests a definition for the subject matter of a new patent classification 
that is broad enough to accomplish the goal of improving access to 
lifesaving technology while being sufficiently narrow to guard against 
abuse. 
Several portions of the United States Code refer to humanitarian aid and 
give examples in an attempt to define it.170 In the context of US assistance 
to promote reconciliation and recovery from regional conflicts, 
humanitarian assistance “means assistance to meet humanitarian needs, 
including needs for food, medicine, medical supplies and equipment, 
education, and clothing.”171 Similarly, in a foreign relations statute, 
humanitarian assistance “means assistance to meet humanitarian needs, 
including needs for food, medicine, medical supplies, clothing, and 
                                                                                                       
“past persecution, suffering, or other inhumane treatment,” yet ultimately leaving to a 
jury as a question of fact the decision of whether something was humanitarian or not); 
Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 352 F.3d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(implying that “humanitarian” means “securing the basic necessities for human life”). 
 Patent law prosecution guidelines include an international classification system to 
catalog the subject matter of inventions. MPEP, supra note 42, § 903.09. The 
International Classification of Patents for Inventions has eight principle sections, one of 
which is “Human Necessities.” Id. This definition was deemed unhelpful because it might 
overly constrict the reach of a new classification to the traditional “human necessities” of 
agriculture or pharmaceutical innovations instead of extending benefits to any technology 
with lifesaving implications in extreme lack-of-access situations. 
 One law review article surveyed licensing agreements employed by universities trying 
to ensure access for their technologies, and clauses in some of these agreements either 
defined “humanitarian” or otherwise attempted to delineate what organizations would be 
trusted as access providers. Roose-Snyder & Doyle, supra note 29, at 287, 290 (quoting a 
University of California at Davis license agreement that defines “Humanitarian Purposes” 
as developing or using a technology for the benefit of an “Economically Disadvantaged 
Country,” and quoting a Boston University agreement that defined Public Sector as the 
sovereign government of a country and other specific organizations). While this article 
was useful in modeling the inclusion of specific examples of organizations that would 
qualify as “humanitarian,” the definition was not discussed at length because it is 
overbroad; it does not include the specific purpose served by the technology. 
170 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 401 (2006); 22 U.S.C. § 2296 (2006); 22 U.S.C. § 7803 
(2006). 
171 22 U.S.C. § 2296 (2006). 
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shelter.”172 There are more specific definitions provided in the context of 
humanitarian and civic assistance in conjunction with military operations, 
where the term “humanitarian and civic assistance” means any of the 
following: 
1) Medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided in areas 
of a country that are rural or are underserved by medical, 
surgical, dental, and veterinary professionals, respectively, 
including education, training, and technical assistance related to 
the care provided; 
2) Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; 
3) Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; 
4) Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.173 
While several good examples of lifesaving technology are included in 
this definition, it does not include any sort of temporal aspect. If this 
definition were implemented in a patent classification, many technologies 
could arguably be lifesaving by extension, and—contrary to its intended 
purpose—the classification would no longer reach only technologies that 
are likely to have an immediate lifesaving effect for those that would 
otherwise be deprived access to the technology. The relationship between a 
particular technology and the preservation of a life might be too tenuous 
under this definition to justify its verbatim adoption for the HOPE 
classification. 
The United States Code also articulates how the Internal Revenue Service 
defines humanitarian donations that result in tax deductibility.174 However, 
the tax law focuses on the nonprofit nature of the organizations receiving 
such donations, not on the lifesaving effect of what the organization does.175 
                                                 
172 22 U.S.C. § 7803 (2006). 
173 10 U.S.C. § 401 (2006). 
174 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). 
175 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2006).  
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As such, under section 501(c)(3) of the US Internal Revenue Code, 
“humanitarian” is defined too broadly within the context of nonprofit 
organizations. Thus, while the United States Code may be helpful for 
providing examples of humanitarian efforts, a particular definition should 
not be drawn straight from these statutes.176 
The other particularly helpful sources for an adequate humanitarian 
definition are humanitarian relief organizations themselves. The United 
Nations organizes its humanitarian efforts through the Office for 
Coordinated Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).177 Several definitions and 
purpose statements appear throughout OCHA materials, touching on the 
fundamental principles of humanitarian organizations. For example, “[t]he 
purpose of humanitarian action is to protect life and health and ensure 
                                                                                                       
List of [tax-]exempt corporations . . . (3): Corporations, and any 
community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated 
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, 
literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international 
amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the 
provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of 
cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures 
to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part 
of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise 
attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in 
subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in 
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political 
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public 
office. 
176 In the Food and Drug Administration context, the Code also provides an 
unconventional definition—humanitarian means treating less than 4,000 individuals. 
“Devices intended to benefit patients in the treatment and diagnosis of diseases or 
conditions that affect fewer than 4,000 individuals in the United States,” qualifying under 
this definition means getting certain exemptions from the stricture of the performance 
requirements (360d) & premarket approval (360e). 21 U.S.C. § 360j(m) (2006). 
177 UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR COORDINATED HUMANITARIAN AFF., 
http://www.unocha.org (last visited Dec. 13, 2011). 
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respect for human beings,”178 and “[h]umanitarian aid workers strive to 
provide  life-saving assistance to the increasing number of people affected 
by man-made and natural disasters every year,”179 These statements help 
ground the word “humanitarian” in addressing the most disparate access 
gap contexts. OCHA establishes that humanitarian aid is based on a 
“respect for human beings” that should focus on “protect[ing] life and 
health” by “provid[ing] life-saving assistance” in the context of poverty and 
“natural disasters.” 
Combining principles from these various definitions, the definition for a 
new patent classification should be: 
Humanitarian technology means technology likely to preserve 
human life by meeting basic needs that if unmet due to poverty or 
disaster would likely ultimately result in death within six months 
or be the direct cause of death. Such needs include food, medicine, 
medical supplies, sanitation, healthcare, and the like. 
 Humanitarian agencies are entities situated to best identify the 
poverty- or disaster-based need and disseminate corresponding 
humanitarian technology accordingly. 
Such agencies shall include: 
a. The sovereign government of a country; 
b. Agencies of the United Nations, the World Health 
Organization, and the World Bank; 
c. Organizations which are members of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent; 
d. International charitable agencies (also known as 
nongovernmental organizations or NGOs), including but 
                                                 
178 World Humanitarian Day, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR THE COORDINATION OF 
HUMANITARIAN AFF., http://ochaonline.un.org/whd/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2011) 
(emphasis added). 
179 World Humanitarian Day Background, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/events/humanitarianday/background.shtml (last visited Dec. 13, 
2011) (emphasis added). 
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not limited to Oxfam, Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors 
Without Borders), and so forth. 
The above definition addresses the concern that the targeted access gap is 
generally due to poverty or disaster. Additionally, it sets a timeline to 
ensure that technology too distantly related to saving lives is excluded, 
while allowing an exception for technology that combats direct but slower 
killers, such as HIV/AIDS and deadly illnesses specifically related to 
immune systems weakened by HIV/AIDS. It gives examples of what 
technology might specifically provide and details organizations that would 
be potential consumers and partners in the technology. 
IV. RULES FOR A NEW CLASSIFICATION 
The rules for the new classification should improve access to the group of 
individuals most affected by the access gap: those who have the least ability 
to obtain access to the technology and who also are most likely to die 
without it. To accomplish this increase in access, the rules governing the 
certification should make certain impositions. However, imposing access 
improvements without also offering incentive modifications may chill 
innovation. As such, incentives must also be granted through the operation 
of the rules. Part A below discusses proposed improvements to access while 
Part B discusses possible additional incentives that could reestablish the 
balance needed in the innovation dichotomy. 
A. Guarantees to Access 
1. Require Collaboration with Humanitarian Organizations 
If the goal of a new certification is to improve access for those 
experiencing the greatest access disparity, a mechanism is necessary to 
identify those that are in the greatest need with the least access. 
Humanitarian organizations have well-established methods of not only 
recognizing needs, but also of addressing them with appropriate resources. 
450 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 
Since humanitarian organizations already have the infrastructure in place to 
both identify needs and disseminate responsive resources, requiring 
partnership between them and potential patent holders of humanitarian 
technology is an efficient mechanism to distribute the technology. 
a) Evidence of Agreement 
The most appropriate way to ensure such a partnership would be by 
contract. The HOPE application rules could require a copy of a contract 
showing the applicant’s partnership with a humanitarian organization. Such 
a contract would require the patent holder to provide the humanitarian 
organization with the technology at cost or at a minimal profit.180 The 
contract could also be of an output or requirement variety, obligating the 
patent holder to provide the humanitarian organization with a certain 
percentage of the patent holder’s production or certain amounts reflecting 
the quantity that the humanitarian organization expects to be able to 
distribute or utilize. Of course, this contractual obligation would be 
contingent upon actual issuance of the patent to protect the inventor from an 
unfair obligation should the patent not be issued. However, it could provide 
valuable assurance that access to the new technology will be made available 
through humanitarian agencies to those who most desperately need it. 
b) Affidavit Certifying Humanitarian Use 
An additional partnership dynamic would be to require the humanitarian 
organization to submit an affidavit explaining the expected humanitarian 
use of the technology. This would assist the examiner in verifying that the 
technology meets the subject matter definition and would provide a 
safeguard against potential distribution abuse by humanitarian 
organizations. 
                                                 
180 Examples of anywhere from 0.5 to 4 percent profit exist from compulsory licensing 
under TRIPS. Peter Maybardule & Sarah Rimmingto, Compulsory Licenses: A Tool to 
Improve Global Access to the HPV Vaccine?, 35 AM. J. L. & MED. 323, 347 (2009). 
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2. Accountability 
To ensure that humanitarian organizations can continue to receive the 
benefit of such an agreement, sufficient measures for accountability would 
need to be included to guard against potential breach of the agreement by 
the inventor before the access improvements could be realized. 
a) Adjustment of Fee Schedule 
One such accountability measure would be to adjust the fee schedule 
required to maintain a patent. A patent holder must pay a fee at 3.5 years, 
7.5 years, and 11.5 years after the issuance of a patent or lose his or her 
patent monopoly and exclusionary rights.181 If a HOPE patent holder 
showed evidence of honoring the agreement, the fee could be reduced or 
waived. On the other hand, if a HOPE patent holder willfully breached the 
patent, the fee schedule could impose a penalty increase. 
b) Modify Patent Rights 
Another potential accountability measure would be to make patent 
exclusivity contingent on good faith performance of the agreement. For 
example, if a humanitarian organization can show that the patent holder has 
neglected the agreement, the resulting punishment can be to allow the 
organization to engage in compulsory licensing against the patent holder or 
to revoke the patent all together. 
B. Incentives 
To balance the access provisions, incentives are necessary for the 
inventor to agree182 to restrict what would otherwise be a complete 
                                                 
181 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(e)–(g) (2011). 
182 The choice to engage in this exchange is important. While a new classification could 
be imposed in such a manner that any humanitarian technology must comport with HOPE 
requirements to receive a patent (akin to any plant matter being subject to the specific 
plant patent rules), the better option is to allow patent applicants to opt in to the 
certification (akin to making a patent “special,” which only occurs when a patent 
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monopoly over the technology. While most of the proposed incentives 
provide advantages in the patent prosecution process, other incentives 
include tax write-offs, continued market monopoly, and public relations. 
1. Benefits Within the Patent Prosecution Process 
As is the case with many administrative processes, the principal 
complaints of patent prosecution are that the process is too slow, difficult, 
and/or expensive. As such, the primary advantages that would appeal to an 
applicant engaging in the patent prosecution process would be to make the 
process faster, easier, and less expensive. These three advantages are easily 
and justifiably includable in the current patent prosecution process for the 
HOPE Certification. 
a) Expediting the Process (Making it Faster) 
 “New patent applications are normally taken up for examination in the 
order of their United States filing date.”183 However, the USPTO has a 
procedure for requesting accelerated examination called a “petition to make 
special.”184 If the USPTO grants a request to make an application “special,” 
that application will be processed out of turn and examined in advance of 
other applications.185 The “appropriate showing” necessary for the USPTO 
to grant a request to make an application “special” requires an applicant to 
establish that the application fits within a select number of exception 
categories.186 “The exceptions are created to expedite business or to serve 
                                                                                                       
applicant elects to pursue that course). The extra level of choice is likely to increase the 
likelihood that the HOPE patent recipients would actually honor the agreement, 
generating an effect much like the pre-negotiated terms discussed in the context of 
leveraging public scientific capital. 
183 Changes to Practice for Petitions in Patent Applications to Make Special and for 
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an important purpose for public service.”187 The decision to include a new 
exception rests with the director of the USPTO, although the president or 
other department heads can also request a new exception.188 
The existing exception categories found in the MPEP are:  
1) Manufacture (invention is ready for manufacture);  
2) Infringement (invention is being infringed); 
3) Applicant’s Health (is poor and in danger of death before 
finishing application); 
4) Applicant’s Age (is 65 or over, similar reasoning to 3); 
5) Environmental Quality (significantly contributes to restoration 
or maintenance of the basic life-sustaining natural elements, 
e.g., air, water, and soil); 
6) Energy (contributes to the discovery or development of energy 
resources or more efficient utilization of energy); 
7) Recombinant DNA (developments in the area of recombinant 
deoxyribonucleic acid, which “[appear] to have extraordinary 
potential benefit for mankind”); 189 
                                                 
187  
(a) Applications will not be advanced out of turn for examination or for 
further action except as provided by this part, or upon order of the 
Director to expedite the business of the Office, or upon filing of a request 
under paragraph (b) of this section or upon filing a petition under 
paragraphs (c) or (d) of this section with a showing which, in the opinion 
of the Director, will justify so advancing it. 
(b) Applications wherein the inventions are deemed of peculiar 
importance to some branch of the public service and the head of some 
department of the Government requests immediate action for that reason, 
may be advanced for examination.  
37 C.F.R. § 1.102(a)–(b) (2011). 
188 For example, President Ronald Reagan directed the USPTO to permit accelerated 
examination of applications relating to superconductivity. Ned A. Israelsen, Making, 
Using, and Selling Without Infringing: An Examination of 35 U.S.C. Section 271(E) and 
the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 457, 478 n.70 
(1989) (citing MPEP § 708.02(VII) (5th ed., Rev. 6, Oct. 1987)). 
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8) New Applications—Accelerated Examination (requiring a more 
onerous application process, discussed infra p. 455; 
9) Superconductivity; 
10) Inventions relating to HIV/AIDS and Cancer; 
11) Countering Terrorism;190 and 
12) Applications Relating to Biotechnology Filed by Applicants 
who are Small Entities.191 
Humanitarian technology would fit reasonably within this list. It fits 
squarely within the mandate that exceptions must “expedite business or . . . 
serve an important purpose for public service”192 because it would expedite 
the business interactions between inventors and humanitarian organizations 
and serve an important purpose for public service by saving lives through 
improved access. Furthermore, just as countering terrorism would seem to 
have as its primary goal preserving human life, so too would a humanitarian 
technology exception. While it could be argued that the exception for 
“[i]nventions relating to HIV/AIDS and cancer”193 makes the proposed 
                                                                                                       
189 MPEP, supra note 42, at § 708.02(VII) (“This field might lead to ways of controlling 
or treating cancer and hereditary defects . . .  [and] has possible applications in agriculture 
and industry.”). 
190 MPEP, supra note 42, at § 708.02. International terrorism is defined as including  
activities that[:] (A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life 
that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any 
State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the 
jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; [and] (B) appear to be 
intended[:] (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to 
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) 
to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. 
18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2006). 
 
191 All of the exceptions listed in this paragraph are found in MPEP, supra note 42,   
§ 708.02. 
192 37 C.F.R. § 1.102(a)–(b) (2011) (“(b) Applications wherein the inventions are 
deemed of peculiar importance to some branch of the public service and the head of some 
department of the Government requests immediate action for that reason, may be 
advanced for examination.”).  
193 MPEP, supra note 42, § 708.02. 
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humanitarian technology exception moot, the humanitarian technology 
exception would capture a substantially larger field. The humanitarian 
technology exception could either subsume the HIV/AIDS and cancer 
exception, or it could stand alongside it, thereby giving an applicant the 
option to pursue only an expedited application or an expedited application 
with the other attendant advantages of a HOPE Certification. 
b) Simplifying the Process (Making it Easier) 
At first, the accelerated examination exception for new applications looks 
like it may obviate the use for a HOPE acceleration exception. However, a 
closer inspection shows that a HOPE application would provide a simpler 
expediting process than the exception for new applications. 
The exception for new applications requires a more onerous application 
process than a standard application.194 Dirk Thomas, Chandran Iyer, and 
Aziz Burgy explain the requirements and process for applying for 
accelerated examination under the new application exception: 
1) File the application, petition, and required fees 
electronically using the USPTO’s electronic filing system 
(EFS); 
2) File a complete, nonreissue utility or design application 
with three or fewer independent claims and twenty or fewer 
total claims directed to a single invention; 
3) Agree to an interview (including an interview before a first 
Office action) whenever requested by the Examiner to 
discuss the prior art and rejections or objections; 
                                                 
194 See Elizabeth Peters, Are We Living in a Material World?: An Analysis of the Federal 
Circuit’s Materiality Standard Under the Patent Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct, 93 
IOWA L. REV. 1519, 1550 (2008)  (“Unlike the normal PTO application procedure, where 
applicants must disclose only information they knew about at the time of application, an 
applicant under the new procedure must conduct a thorough prior-art search and 
affirmatively state a good-faith belief that the prior-art search was completed properly.”). 
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4) Provide a statement that a pre-examination search195 was 
conducted of US patents and patent application 
publications, foreign patent documents, and nonpatent 
literature; 
5) Agree not to separately argue the patentability of any 
dependent claim during any appeal of the application; and 
6) Provide, at the time of filing, an accelerated examination 
support document with  
a. an information disclosure statement (IDS) in 
compliance with 37 C.F.R. § 1.98 citing each 
reference deemed most closely related to the 
subject matter of each of the claims; 
b. an identification of all the limitations in the claims 
that are disclosed by the reference, specifying 
where the limitation is disclosed in the cited 
reference; 
c. a detailed explanation of how each of the claims is 
patentable over the references cited with the 
particularity required by 37 C.F.R. § 1.111(b) and 
(c); 
d. a concise statement of the utility of the invention 
as defined in each of the independent claims 
(unless the application is a design application); 
                                                 
195 See Shashank Upadhye, Liar Liar Pants On Fire: Towards A Narrow Construction 
For Inequitable Conduct As Applied to the Prosecution of Medical Device and Drug 
Patent Applications, 72 UMKC L. REV. 669, 713–714 (2004)  
In effect, by so certifying, the applicant is ‘helping’ the Examiner find the 
prior art. The Federal Circuit in [General Electric Music Corp. v. Samick 
Music Corp.], stated that the required search must be more than just a 
casual search, more than just looking in one’s files, more than just talking 
to one’s colleagues, and more than just staying within one’s internal 
sources.  
Id. (referencing Gen. Electric Music Corp. v. Samick Music Corp., 19 F.3d 1405, 
1409–1410 (1994)). 
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e. a showing of where each limitation of the claims 
finds support under the first paragraph of 35 
U.S.C. § 112 in the written description of the 
specification; and  
f. identification of any cited references that may be 
disqualified as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 
103(c).196 
In contrast, under a HOPE application, the applicant would need only to 
provide a copy of the contract negotiated with the humanitarian 
organization and an affidavit from the humanitarian organization detailing 
the expected use. Creating the HOPE acceleration option would allow for 
expediting the process without the extra burdens of developing a more 
complete record and additional restrictions on prosecution. 
c) Fee Adjustment (Making it Less Expensive) 
To make the application cheaper, the fees could be adjusted or waived for 
a HOPE application. Fees are routinely waived for petitions for expedited 
patent prosecution when certain specific conditions are met.197 Fees are also 
routinely adjusted for small entity status.198 Considering that the five 
                                                 
196 Dirk Thomas, Chandran Iyer & Aziz Burgy, Slow Down Before Accelerating: 
Litigation Ramifications of Accelerated Examination Procedure on Nanotechnology, 4 
No. 1 A.B.A. SCITECH LAW. 4, 5 (2007). 
197 37 C.F.R. § 1.102(c) (2011): 
A [request to expedite an application] may be filed without a fee if the 
basis for the petition is: 
(1) The applicant’s age or health; or 
(2) That the invention will materially: 
 (i) Enhance the quality of the environment; 
(ii) Contribute to the development or conservation of energy 
resources; or 
 (iii) Contribute to countering terrorism. 
198 37 C.F.R. § 1.27(b) 
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bases199 for waiving fees of petitions to make applications “special” are 
circumstances that are particularly in the public interest, the fee associated 
with requesting an application be made “special” on a HOPE basis should 
also be waived.200 By a similar rationale, subsequent filing and maintenance 
fees could also be reduced in a manner similar to the small entity status. 
However, since the HOPE certification would not be granted until the 
patent is granted, these fee reductions should be accomplished on a 
retroactive basis, refunding the applicant the overpayment only once the 
certification is granted. 
2. Other Incentives 
Various other incentives besides prosecution benefits could also be 
included in the adjusted exchange of a new classification. For example, tax 
write-offs could provide another incentive for an inventor or company to 
pursue a HOPE certification. Most humanitarian organizations are tax-
exempt entities under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c), and therefore any charitable 
contributions made to them could count as tax deductible under 26 U.S.C § 
170.201 The precise amount that would be considered a charitable 
                                                                                                       
Establishment of small entity status permits payment of reduced fees. (1) 
A small entity, as defined in paragraph (a) of this section, who has 
properly asserted entitlement to small entity status pursuant to paragraph 
(c) of this section will be accorded small entity status by the Office in the 
particular application or patent in which entitlement to small entity status 
was asserted. Establishment of small entity status allows the payment of 
certain reduced patent fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 41(h)(1) [50 percent 
reduction of most fees]. 
Id. 
 
199 The five feeless bases are (1) the applicant’s age, (2) the applicant’s health, (3) that the 
invention will materially enhance the quality of the environment, (4) that the invention 
will materially contribute to the development or conservation of energy resources, or (5) 
that the invention will materially contribute to countering terrorism. 37 C.F.R. § 1.102(c). 
200 Marc Verzani, The Orphan Patent Act, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 5, 11 
(1995). 
201 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(c), 170 (2006). 
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contribution would need to be determined between the patent holder and the 
humanitarian organizations. Potential regimes range from the outright 
donation of technology (with a claim for a deduction or credit 
corresponding to the cost of the production) to the claim of a portion of the 
difference between the market price and the price charged to humanitarian 
organizations. If people fear abuse in tax deductions, Congress could enact 
new legislation regulating exactly what could be claimed. 
Another incentive is the opportunity to develop new revenue streams. 
With the HOPE classification aimed at only the greatest access disparity, 
the innovator can still charge a premium in the market as usual. Those 
unaffected by poverty or disaster that are still able to afford the premium on 
intellectual property will continue to do so; the innovator can continue to 
count on that profit as an incentive for registering his/her intellectual 
property. In addition, the HOPE classification effectively develops a 
revenue stream that did not exist before. In the standard market, all 
consumers are in the same sphere of supply and demand. Of those who 
cannot afford a particular technology, the lack of access to the technology is 
only life-threatening to the specific subset of those people that do not have 
the means to even afford alternative remedies (i.e., those particularly 
affected by disaster or poverty). The HOPE classification would thus not 
rob the original market of any customers or profit because those reached 
through HOPE processes would never have been able to afford access to 
that market. With the introduction of a third-party humanitarian 
organization that would not usually be a customer at the market price—but 
that is willing to pay a reduced price to subsidize the cost for the small 
subset of the unreached market consisting of disaster- and poverty-stricken 
people—the company can actually capture an untapped source of revenue. 
In this way, the company could still exploit the very profitable private 
market, but add the small profit of the new humanitarian market to it as 
well. 
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An additional possibility would be to allow or provide term extensions 
exclusively for HOPE patents. At a conceptual level, this would give the 
patent holder more time to exploit the private market in exchange for the 
generation of a humanitarian market. A specific term extension granted 
exclusively to HOPE patents would implement the incentives suggested by 
wildcard patent terms (as discussed supra p. 417), but solve the 
predictability problem for generics. Additionally, by limiting the extension 
to a specific type of subject matter and restricting the incentive to the same 
technology that receives the improved access, the balance of the innovation 
dichotomy is narrowly tailored to a specific innovation instead of applying a 
rigid general rule to a specific situation. 
Finally, the new classification could also provide a public relations 
incentive. An applicant will have a public relations incentive to get a HOPE 
patent because it is a certification of contribution to the public good, and it 
serves the underprivileged. The opportunity to publicize a company’s 
acquisition of a new HOPE patent for a particular technology could allow a 
company to improve its public image due to the favorable contribution to 
the public good reflected in the certification’s requirements. Going beyond 
a mere announcement of its acquisition of a HOPE patent, a company could 
further utilize the certification for public relations by boasting about the 
number of HOPE patents it holds in its portfolio. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Implementing the HOPE classification could provide another tool to 
address the greater issue of closing the gap of the access disparity that 
results from the innovation dichotomy and the current intellectual property 
regime. In light of the devastating tsunami in Japan in the spring of 2011, 
the continuing aftermath of the catastrophic 2010 earthquake in Haiti, and 
the lingering effects of Hurricane Katrina in the United States, incentives to 
improve the cost-efficiency of humanitarian aid in disaster situations are 
more needed than ever. With the ongoing massive death counts from health 
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epidemics such as AIDS or starvation, access to lifesaving technology is 
hugely needed in poverty-stricken regions. Even the USPTO has recognized 
the pressing current need to provide incentives to pursue humanitarian 
activity.202 By implementing a new patent classification that offers new 
incentives—such as expediting applications, providing fee adjustments, 
employing tax deductions or credits, capturing additional profits, and 
establishing goodwill in public relations—the USPTO could inspire a whole 
host of businesses to commit to working with humanitarian organizations to 
reach poverty- and disaster-stricken people with lifesaving technology. The 
result would be something long missing from the patent system: HOPE. 
 
                                                 
202 Request for Comments on Incentivizing Humanitarian Technologies and Licensing 
Through the Intellectual Property System, 75 Fed. Reg. 57261 (Sept. 20, 2010), available 
at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/pdf/2010-23395.pdf (“The USPTO is also 
exploring ideas for other strategies that would use the patent system to incentivize 
activity addressing humanitarian needs.”).  
